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THE FOUNDATION OF THE MEXICAN WELFARE STATE
AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE 1990s
TOMOKO MURAI
Before 1982 Mexico’s welfare state regime was a limited conservative one that put pri-
ority on the social security of organized labor. But following the country’s debt crisis in
1982, this regime changed to a hybrid liberal model. The Ernest Zedillo government
(1995–2000) in particular pushed ahead with liberal reform of the social security sys-
tem. This paper examines the characteristics and the policy making of the social security
reforms in the 1990s. The results suggest that underlying these reforms was the restruc-
turing of the economy and the need to cope with the cost of this restructuring. The paper
also points out that one of the main factors making possible the rapid execution of the
reforms were the weakened political clout of the officialist labor unions due to their
steady breakdown during the 1990s and the increase in the monopolistic power of the
state vis-à-vis the position of labor during the negotiations on social security reforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the 1990s Mexico promoted economic policies based on neoliberaleconomic principles and their emphasis on the importance of market func-
tions. As part of the rapid economic restructuring during that decade, the
governments of Carlos Salinas (1989–94) and Ernest Zedillo (1995–2000), whose
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had held power from 1920 until 2000, in-
troduced a new policy to deal with poverty and carried out the reform of the pension
system and restructuring of social security. This study will look at the background
to social security reform during the 1990s and examine the characteristics and the
policy making of the reforms.
Among the studies that have examined the formative period of the social security
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system, there is the research by Spalding (1978, 1981) that analyzed the initiative
of the state and its limitations in laying down the system; there is also the research
by Mesa-Lago (1978) and Brachet-Márquez (1994) which focused on the influence
of the labor class on state policy making during the formation of the social security
system. Regarding research on the reforms of the 1990s, there have been many
studies that have taken a functionalist approach in examining them in relation to
Mexico’s neoliberal economic reforms and change of economic model. But there
has been little research on the political factors in the reforms, with the exception of
the poverty alleviation program (National Solidarity Program, PRONASOL) of the
Salinas period, about which there is a large amount of research which has focused
on how it was used politically (Dresser 1994; Cornelius, Craig, and Fox 1994; and
others).
The present study also deals with the reform of the social security system as a
part of Mexico’s economic restructuring during the 1990s, and it adopts a function-
alist approach to analyze the role that social security reform played in the rapid
restructuring of the economy. This study will also examine the importance of the
officialist labor unions which had been central political actors during the formative
period of Mexico’s social security system and which were also major partners with
the state in negotiations over the reforms of the 1990s. At the same time it will
examine the impact that transformation of the relationship between the officialist
labor unions and state corporatism had on the 1990s reforms.
To carry out this examination, the study will begin with a survey, in Section II, of
the period from 1920 to 1970, looking at the formative process of Mexico’s social
security system and the factors involved in this process. Section III will provide a
summary of the social security reforms in the 1990s and will examine their charac-
teristics. Section IV will analyze the political and economic basis for reforming the
social security system. The conclusion will examine the transformation of Mexico
as a welfare state.
II. THE FORMATION OF MEXICO’S SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
This section will give an overview of the formative process of the social security
system from the 1920s to the 1970s. It will then examine the characteristics of the
system and the factors important in its formation and development.
The ideological and legal basis for Mexico’s social security system was Article
123 of the 1917 Constitution enacted after the revolution. This article expressed the
labor rights of workers and indicated the need for enacting a comprehensive law to
provide them with social security. However, the development of social security
services in the postrevolutionary period took place in a very limited and fragmented
way because only a few strong occupational groups were able to enjoy the benefits
of the social insurance programs that were set up. It was not until 1943 that a more
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comprehensive social insurance law was enacted. At that time under the influence
of the International Labour Organization, there was an international trend toward
establishing social security systems. In line with this trend, the Manuel Avila
Camacho government, which intended to modernize the state by promoting import
substituting industrialization, enacted the Social Insurance Law of 1943. As Spalding
(1978) pointed out, behind this decision was the state’s intention to provide com-
prehensive social security to urban labor which underpinned the state-led industri-
alization plan (p. 151). The enacted social insurance system consisted of old age,
survivors, and disability pensions, health insurance, and occupational accident com-
pensation. Payment into the system was obligatory for all those insured. The rate of
contribution into the pension and health portion was 12 per cent of a worker’s base
wages with the ratio of contribution being 3 per cent paid in by the government, 3
per cent by the worker, and 6 per cent by the employer; payment for the occupa-
tional accident compensation portion was borne entirely by the employer (Spalding
1978, p. 145). On the basis of the 1943 law, the Mexican Institute of Social Security
(IMSS), a government agency in charge of social insurance operations for employ-
ees in the private sector and their families, was set up in 1944. This was followed in
1959 by the establishment of the Institute of Social Security and Services for State
Workers (ISSSTE). The social insurance operations of these two institutes were
central to Mexico’s social security system as it gradually developed from the 1950s
through the 1970s.
One characteristic of the social security system during its formative period was
the linkage of social insurance to occupations in the formal sector. In an effort to
consolidate the revolutionary government during the period of disorder following
the revolution, the Plutarco Elías Calles government (1924–28) started to provide
social insurance to federal government employees in 1925, followed by military
personnel in 1926, then school teachers in 1928. This first step was followed in the
1930s by the expansion of social insurance coverage to workers in key industries
like the Petroleum Workers’ Union of Mexico (STPRM) in 1935 and from 1936–38
to the Railroad Workers’ Union of Mexico (TFRM). The expansion of coverage in
the 1930s was the work of the Lázaro Cárdenas government (1934–38) which sought
to make labor unions the base of its support by facilitating and encouraging the
conclusion of collective agreements that included social security benefits for em-
ployees in these big unions (Mesa-Lago 1978, pp. 212–15).1
When the government decided to enact the Social Insurance Law of 1943 to
consolidate the social security systems covering the private sector, most of the large,
powerful unions expressed opposition to or dissatisfaction with the IMSS social
insurance system because of its low benefits. The petroleum and railway unions
1 In return the labor unions of these two industries gave total support to the government when it
nationalized the petroleum industry in 1937 then the railroads in 1938.
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were among them; both refused to become affiliated with the IMSS and chose to
maintain their own independent coverage systems (Spalding 1978, p. 157). This
development led to the fragmentation of Mexico’s social security system which
still remains a characteristic of the system.2
A second characteristic of Mexico’s social security system was the strong influence
of state corporatism which has been a very important factor for the PRI government’s
long-standing rule. The formation of this characteristic goes back to the time when
legislation of the social insurance law was proposed and implemented. At that time,
in contrast to the opposition expressed by the strong labor unions, the Confedera-
tion of Mexican Workers (CTM), principally made up of union organizations in
small and medium-sized companies, totally supported the government’s efforts to
reorganize the social security system. The CTM sent representatives to the Techni-
cal Drafting Committee right from the drafting stage of the bill, and it took an
active part in enacting the social insurance system. Then it carried out a vigorous
information and publicity campaign for the social insurance system, urging its ac-
ceptance among affiliates and attempting to restrain the opposition of constituent
organizations (Spalding 1978, pp. 139–59). Because of its high profile participa-
tion in setting up the social insurance system, the CTM was able to secure 50 per
cent of the representation that labor had to the IMSS, and this gave the CTM a
strong voice in the operations of the system which were worked out through tripar-
tite deliberation between the government, labor, and employers.
The CTM was born when the Committee of the Proletarian Defense convened
the Congress for the Unification of Workers in 1936, one of its purposes being to
support the Cárdenas government against Calles’ political dominance. The Cárdenas
government brought the CTM along with the National Confederation of Peasants
(CNC) and the Federation of State Workers’ Unions (FSTSE) into the support base
of his ruling Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM) (which was later renamed the
Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI). This gave those organizations representa-
tion in the party which gave them a voice in political affairs. In so doing however,
they helped build a corporatist system that was based on a politically compliant
relationship subordinate to the political decisions of the state. This corporatist rela-
tionship established between the state and the CTM played a very important role in
the implementation and administration of the IMSS social insurance system.
A third characteristic of Mexico’s social security system was the limited extent
of its coverage. From the 1950s through the 1970s the number of workers in occu-
pations in the formal sector increased because of the expansion of the public sector
and the stable growth of the manufacturing sector due to the government’s promo-
2 The Mexican social security system is actually made up of various different social insurance pro-
grams, such as those for the IMSS, for the ISSSTE, for the petroleum workers, and for the military,
and the disparity in the level of benefits among the programs can be substantial.
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tion of import substituting industrialization. This in turn brought about the expan-
sion of the social insurance system in urban areas. Coverage gradually rose from
4.3 per cent in 1950, to 11.5 per cent in 1960, 25.3 per cent in 1970, and 46.0 per
cent in 1980,3 but even as of 1980 more than half of the population were not cov-
ered by social insurance. Among the factors that prevented the universalization of
the social insurance system, being a late-developing industrial country, Mexico’s
manufacturing sector was capital intensive and did not absorb a sufficient amount
of the country’s large labor pool (Guillén Romo 1984, pp. 88–89). Along with this,
the country’s import substituting industrialization stalled during the 1970s. Also
the indigenous communities concentrated in the south of the country and other
rural poor living in traditional villages were left outside of the government’s strate-
gies for modernization; therefore the expansion of the social insurance system in
the wake of economic growth took place only among urban area residents and did
not extend to the rural poor. In short, the limitations in Mexico’s development strat-
egy of import substituting industrialization, and problems peculiar to the country’s
social structure lay behind the low level of diffusion of social insurance.
Another factor explaining the dual structure of the social security system was
that the IMSS social insurance system was of a Bismarkian type which made con-
tributing to the system obligatory, and right from the planning stage the urban and
rural poor were left out because they did not have the economic wherewithal to
contribute to the system on a regular basis (Spalding 1978, pp. 139–52). It has also
been pointed out by Gordon that a factor for excluding the peasantry from the pro-
visions of the social security system was that after the revolution, the Mexican
government promoted the sectorial intermediation of interests for constituent so-
cial groups of state corporatism (Gordon 1997, p. 12). In other words, the peasantry
did not enjoy the benefits of expanding social security services because the revolu-
tionary government’s sectorial intermediation of interests for the peasantry was
primarily intended to be the redistribution of land through land reform. The CNC,
the nationwide peasant organization that the Cárdenas government made central in
rural society for dealing with the demands of rural organizations, had the task of
intermediating in the redistribution of ejido (communal land for agriculture, for-
estry, and livestock) and the allocation of funding for production; but as pointed out
by Yokoyama (1996), the actual authority for allocating resources was in the hands
of the state governors and the local bodies and offices of the federal government,
and the heads of the ejido committees, who were the direct negotiators of applica-
tions for agricultural land, in many cases maintained a relationship of coexistence
with the caciques and other local authorities and powerholders (pp. 35–41). In other
words, the political function of the CNC was to co-opt the peasants and bring them
into the PRI’s ruling system, and it would seem that within this power structure
3 Calculated by the author from INEGI (1999).
267MEXICO
there was no route available for the mini-landholders and landless peasants in the
traditional villages to express their own interests.
A fourth characteristic of the social security system was the stratification of so-
cial security services and the residual character of public social assistance services.
In the 1970s Mexico began a policy of poverty alleviation for the rural poor who
until then had been left out of government social policies. However, although com-
paratively large-scale social investment was undertaken for social assistance ser-
vices directed at the poor, these largely failed to reach their intended beneficiaries.
One factor for this was that the government gave first priority to expanding social
security services for urban organized labor which was a principal constituent of
state corporatism. In 1972, during the Luis Echeverría government, when state
finances were strained, the Institute of the National Housing Fund for Workers
(INFONAVIT) and the Housing Fund of the Institute of Social Security and Ser-
vices for State Workers (FOVISSSTE) were set up, the former for the purpose of
providing low-cost housing and financing to urban workers in the private sector, the
latter to do the same for public workers. In 1978 the CTM took over all jurisdiction
of INFONAVIT (Brachet-Márquez 1994, p. 144). This move by the CTM was an
event that truly bespoke of the political clientelism of the then incumbent José López
Portillo government toward the CTM. The political circumstances behind the pri-
ority of the governments were the growth of social movements since the end of the
1960s that were against the authoritarian rule of the PRI, the growth of unions
which had broke away from membership in the CTM in search of a more demo-
cratic unionism, and the increasing fragility of state corporatism established since
the Cárdenas government (Brachet-Márquez 1994). In this situation, the expansion
of the social security system came to play a more important role in placating orga-
nized labor in order to maintain PRI’s long-standing rule.
In contrast to the priority given to urban labor, the public social assistance ser-
vices for the poor were carried out in a residual manner. For example, following
amendment of the Social Insurance Law in 1973, a plan to expand the medical
assistance service for rural areas was inaugurated in 1974, but after a few years its
budget was sharply reduced. One of the reasons behind this was that part of the
finances for the plan came from the accounts of the IMSS pensions for old age,
survivors, and disability.4 Therefore, some of the technocrats and employees of the
IMSS were opposed to the plan because they feared that the future growth of the
rural population would lead to the financial deterioration of the social insurance
system (Spalding 1981, pp. 149–52). Then came the oil boom swelling state rev-
enues, and the federal government’s abundance of funds also spread to the social
4 Sixty per cent of the funds for the rural medical assistance service were provided by the federal
government with the IMSS supplying the other 40 per cent; most of the funds for this 40 per cent
came from the IMSS pension accounts for old age, survivors, and disability (Spalding 1981, p.
150).
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assistance programs of the poor. But not long afterwards, this period of expanding
services was brought to an end by the country’s debt crisis that broke out in 1982.
Thus the social assistance services aimed at the poor lacked any firm institutional
support and stable financial backing by the state.
Finally it needs to be pointed out that poverty alleviation policy was assigned a
supplementary role in the government’s politico-economic strategy of the time.
The programs were implemented because the production of basic grains had stag-
nated leading to the rapid rise of food imports in the 1970s (Sanderson 1984, p.
120). Thus the poverty alleviation program was part of the government’s policy to
increase food production in order to curb Mexico’s trade deficit and to keep supply-
ing cheap food to the urban population. This was one of the reasons why the primal
objective of the poverty alleviation programs in the 1970s was to raise the income
of the poor peasants by providing direct assistance to small-scale agricultural pro-
duction and expanding subsidies and public investment in this sector. Improving
basic social infrastructure and expanding social services in rural areas were sec-
ondary considerations.5 In other words, poverty alleviation programs were not de-
signed in accordance with the social rights of the poor and their demands for ex-
panding social security (Murai 2001).
Another intention of the state for implementing the programs was to mitigate the
rising social discontent in rural areas at that time (Sanderson 1984, p. 117). From
the late 1960s peasants movements and illegal land occupation were becoming more
frequent. However, by that time the state-led land reform plan had stalled. The
government’s policy to alleviate rural poverty could be interpreted as a new secto-
rial intermediation of interests for the poor peasantry.
Despite being encumbered by the various problems discussed above, Mexico’s
social security system continued to expand right up to the outbreak of the debt
crisis in 1982. The growth of the welfare state continued during the 1970s despite
the country’s steadily worsening financial condition (see Figure 1), and this was
possible because of the expanding social security system, rising wages to cope with
inflation,6 as well as the expansionist development policy pursued by the state. This
growing welfare state embodied the populism of the governments at the time, but it
relied heavily on external borrowing, and clearly it could not be sustained financially.
5 This was clearly evident in the allocation of investment by the Program of Public Investment for
Rural Development (PIDER) for the purpose of alleviating rural poverty. Between 1973 and 1983,
about 60–70 per cent of the total investment by PIDER went to supporting agricultural production;
only about 10–12 per cent was used for rural clinics, installing drinking water, and other basic
infrastructure (Cernea 1983, pp. 101–4).
6 The Luis Echeverría government made income redistribution one of its important policy goals, and
carried out wage increases to cope with inflation. The following José López Portillo government
inherited a serious economic crisis from the Echeverría regime, and early in its term, the new
government undertook financial retrenchment which included a policy of wage restraints. This was
strongly opposed by the unions and was eased following the onset of the oil boom.
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III. NEOLIBERAL REFORM OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
IN THE 1990S
The debt crisis of 1982 became a watershed for Mexico’s mode of economic devel-
opment, largely because the IMF and the World Bank were demanding that debtor
countries introduce restructuring policies that shifted them away from their long-
standing mixed economy systems based on state intervention and import substitut-
ing industrialization and move them toward a neoliberal economic system based on
the principle of market competition. Pressed by the urgent need to reschedule the
payments on Mexico’s huge mass of accumulated debts, the Miguel de la Madrid
government (1983–88) had no other choice than to accept restructuring of the
economy which commenced soon after the debt crisis broke out. The government
undertook stringent financial retrenchment, and during de la Madrid’s term in of-
fice, Mexico abandoned its long-held policy of state-interventionist economic de-
velopment. The next two governments, that of Salinas then Zedillo, accelerated
liberalization of the economy which included laying out a reform of the social se-
curity system. This section will focus on the reform of the IMSS pension system
and the poverty alleviation policies carried out by these two governments during
the 1990s.
A. IMSS Pension Reform
As in other Latin American countries during the 1980s, the financial condition of
Mexico’s pension system continued to deteriorate due to such factors as economic
crises, high inflation, growth of the informal economy, the increased nonpayment
of insurance premiums, and the aging of the working population as a result of rapid
change in the country’s demographic composition. Late in 1990 a team of experts
made up of officials from the Bank of Mexico and the Secretariat for Finance and
Public Credit (SHCP) drafted a reform plan that applied the Chili model which the
World Bank was advocating for Mexico. This would gradually convert the IMSS
pension scheme into a mandatory savings scheme (System of Retirement Savings,
SAR) to be privately managed and financed by employers’ contributions. The new
system would be run by private financial companies which was intended to increase
domestic savings. The plan was accepted by the employers’ association (Social
Union of Mexican Employers, USEM) on the condition that contributions would
not be increased, but it was opposed by the IMSS administrators. The CTM also
partially opposed it because the plan did not include union representation in the
SAR management (Murillo 2001, pp. 102–3; Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002, pp. 697–
99). After a political compromise between a tripartite of government, employer,
and labor representatives, the plan was revised (Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002,
pp. 697–99). Under the legislation approved in February 1992, employers would
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pay an additional pension premium (equal to 2 per cent of a worker’s base wage)7
which would go into the SAR funds kept at the Bank of Mexico and accumulated as
an individual capitalization “retirement savings” separate from the existing IMSS
pension account (Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002, pp. 697–99).8 But there were no
further developments, and pension system reform remained stalled for the remain-
der of the Salinas presidency.
In December 1995, a year after the Zedillo government took office, the Social
Insurance Law was amended, and from July 1997, the IMSS pension program shifted
from the existing pay-as-you-go system to a private capitalization system. Behind
this rapid pace of pension reform during Zedillo’s term was the outbreak of a sec-
ond financial crisis (in December 1994) which further worsened the financial state
of the pension system. From 1991 insurance rates had gradually risen for old age,
survivors, and disability pensions, but an audit by the IMSS showed that were the
system left unchanged and the present level of benefits maintained, the government
would have to raise the rate of insurance premium payments to 23.3 per cent of a
worker’s base wage by 2020. Such a raise in payments, however, would increase
the burden on employers which would adversely affect their competitiveness. It
would also lead to more nonaffiliation in the existing pension system, more
underreporting of wages, and more nonpayment of social insurance premiums.
Relying on the expediency of using public funds to cover the pension system deficit
would increase the burden on government finances which in turn would put a heavier
burden on the macroeconomy. With the pension system in such dire straits, the
Zedillo government concluded that over the mid to long term it would be impos-
sible to sustain the pay-as-you-go system, and there was no other choice than to
move to a private capitalization pension system (Solís Soberón and Villagómez
1999, pp. 125–32; Tani 2001, pp. 192–93). But there was another factor behind the
shift to a pension system based on private capitalization. One of the causes for
Mexico’s financial crisis in late 1994 was the shortage of long-term capital in do-
mestic capital markets, and a top priority of the Zedillo government was to develop
Mexican capital markets by expanding domestic savings. The move to the new
pension system coincided with this government macroeconomic objective (Poder
Ejecutivo Federal 1995, pp. 139–44).
An examination of the political developments propelling this whirlwind revision
of the Social Insurance Law will be left to the next section. The remainder of this
section will look at the essential changes that reform brought to the IMSS pension
system. The reforms first subdivided the operations of the social insurance system
into five sections: (1) occupational accident protection insurance, (2) health insur-
7 Employers accepted an increase in contributions in exchange for a lower wage increase (Mesa-
Lago and Müller 2002, p. 698).
8 In March 1992, a SAR for federal government employees was also established (Corta 2002, p. 5).
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ance, (3) disability and survivors pensions, (4) retirement/old-age pensions, and (5)
child daycare. This clarified premium payments by separating them into the financial
accounts of each section. Within the sections for retirement/old-age, and disability
and survivors pensions, operations were separated into those for the existing pay-
as-you-go disability and survivors pensions and those for the retirement/old-age
pensions which was based entirely on the private capitalization system. In this way
the latter pension operations were converted from the pay-as-you-go system to a
totally individual capitalization and defined contribution pension system. A worker
insured by the IMSS chose one from among thirteen pension fund administrators
known as afores, companies administrating pension accounts, with whom the worker
opened a private capitalization pension account. The funds deposited in this ac-
count were managed by a pension fund investment specialist called a siefore, a
company specializing in the investment of funds deposited with the afores. In this
way the IMSS old-age pension accounts were reorganized into individual invest-
ment-type pensions connected to the domestic financial markets which in effect
introduced the market principle into the social security system. The reforms left
intact the pension system for public officials and other non-IMSS pension pro-
grams. But with IMSS covering 80 per cent of all workers participating in pension
programs, the shift of the system over to a private capitalization pension system
was a drastic reform of Mexico’s pension system.
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that social insurance reform was
carried out as part of financial strategy and the need to reform state finances. It was
not meant to improve the quality of social security services or promote universal-
ization of the system. For example, after the 1982 economic crisis, the health insur-
ance operations of the IMSS social insurance system fell into chronic deficit be-
cause of the decline in income from premium payments due to the continual fall in
workers’ wages. This led to a fall in the quality of the health services covered by
social insurance. Surplus funds from the pension operations were used to ease the
chronic shortfall in the health insurance operations, but the 1995 revision of the
Social Insurance Law shut off the path for shifting funds from the pension surplus
over to the health insurance section which caused health services to deteriorate
further (Trejo and Jones 1998, pp. 83–84; Laurell 2001, p. 91).9
Reform of the social insurance system also included setting up a new family
health insurance program as part of the health insurance system. This was open on
a voluntary affiliation basis to workers in the urban informal sector and the self-
9 A revision of the Social Insurance Law in 1992 had already prohibited the use of surplus pension
funds to make up for the shortfall in the health insurance account. But the subdivision of the social
insurance system into five sections effected by the 1995 revision also subdivided the sources of
funds, and each section had to become self-profit making. This made the relationship between the
income from premium payments and the outgo for the provision of each section more transparent
and strict.
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employed as well as to their families. These were people who previously had been
left out of the IMSS social insurance system. Despite this expansion of eligibility,
however, results of the 2000 census showed that 57.8 per cent10 of the total popula-
tion was still not making use of social health insurance services (INEGI 2001, p.
653), indicating that the expansion of this new voluntary insurance had not pro-
gressed as well as the government had hoped. Factors for this included the high
premium rate of 22.4 per cent of the official minimum wage set for all those volun-
tary insured, and the passive attitude of the IMSS in promoting participation in the
new health program (Dávila and Guijarro 2000, p. 37).11
The IMSS social insurance system, even after reforms, remained fundamentally
a social insurance for employees of the formal sector, and expansion of the system’s
coverage was tied to economic growth and job creation. However, the coverage
failed to expand because of growing employment instability, the expansion of the
informal economy, and the stagnation of the manufacturing industry in recent years.
The actual pension participation rate of Mexico’s population over sixty years old
(in 1997) was 23 per cent in urban areas and a mere 7 per cent in rural areas, far
lower than Brazil’s (in 1997) 62 per cent and 75 per cent respectively (ECLAC
2000, p. 136). Meanwhile, Mexico’s total expenditures on health care per capita
during 1999 were between U.S.$180 and U.S.$225, but the portion that went to
health services for the poor was only U.S.$19 to U.S.$28 (Cercone and St. Antoine
2001, p. 414), indicating that a large discrepancy in health services still exists. This
means that the long-standing problems of a dual structure and social stratification
that have been part of the social security system since its formation remain unre-
solved. Also the percentage of the population as of 1998 that lived below the pov-
erty line stood at 47 per cent (ECLAC 2000, p. 40), showing that poverty allevia-
tion in Mexico with its huge population of poor continues to be an urgent task
confronting the state.
B. Transformation of Poverty Alleviation Policy in the 1990s
The rising social costs and worsening poverty during the 1990s in countries that
carried out economic restructuring compelled governments to reconsider the prob-
lems of poverty and brought renewed international recognition of the importance of
poverty alleviation. In Mexico expenditures for poverty alleviation rose gradually
in the 1990s, and during that decade of rapid economic restructuring, the Salinas
10 The figure of around 57.8 per cent of the population that did not make use of social health insurance
services is based on INEGI (2001, p. 653). But another figure often reported in Mexican statistical
sources is a nonaffiliation rate of around 43 per cent. From the difference between the two figures,
it can be inferred that a sizable number of companies and individuals are not making their insur-
ance premium payments.
11 From a January 18, 2002 interview with Maite Guijarro, researcher of health economics at the
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE), Mexico City.
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and Zedillo regimes undertook large-scale poverty alleviation programs. These pos-
sessed the following characteristics.
Firstly, the programs were compensatory as well as supplementary in character
to counter the changes taking place in the structure of the economy. The original
objective of the PRONASOL, introduced during Salinas’ presidency, was to cope
with urban and rural poverty by providing direct support in order to improve living
conditions in poor communities where poverty had been exacerbated by economic
restructuring. Another poverty alleviation effort, the Program for Direct Assistance
to Agriculture (PROCAMPO), was aimed specifically at the rural areas. With the
accelerating liberalization of trade in agricultural products, producers of basic grains
were expected to suffer severely, and PROCAMPO was introduced as a long-term
fixed period program (1993–2008) to give direct income support to producers while
facilitating the changeover to crops with greater market competitiveness.
The Zedillo government introduced the Education, Health, and Nutrition Pro-
gram (PROGRESA) to help the extremely impoverished in rural areas. Running
from 1997 to 2001,12 the program invested in human capital by providing basic
social services, the primary objective being to equip children from extremely im-
poverished rural households with a minimum of capabilities needed for entering
into economically productive activities (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1997, p. 20). In
1997 when the Zedillo government announced a new policy approach to poverty
alleviation, it declared that the “equality of opportunity” though investment in hu-
man capital was to be the central element in combating poverty; the government’s
objective was not “equality of results” through income redistribution (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal 1997, p. 20). With the state promoting free trade, this announcement meant
that Mexico’s long-standing policy of income redistribution by supporting the agri-
cultural production of poor farmers was no longer regarded as the government’s
principal approach to poverty alleviation. Evidence of this change was reflected in
the financial expenditures related to poverty alleviation in 2000; 48.8 per cent of
these expenditures were for “investing in human capital for the poor,” while an-
other 35.5 per cent went to costs for “improving the physical and social infrastruc-
ture in poor areas.” By comparison, only 16.2 per cent of expenditures went for
“promoting income opportunities for the poor” (INEGI 2003, p. 614). About half of
the operating costs of the latter policy went into expenditures for the Temporary
Employment Program (PET) set up in response to the financial crisis of 1995 and
which creates temporary jobs for the extremely impoverished rural working popu-
lation to lessen the risk of having no source of income when rural jobs grew scarce
during the agricultural slack season.
12 In 2002 PROGRESA was renamed the Program of Human Development (OPORTUNIDADES)
which still continues to function. The presently ruling Vicente Fox government has expanded its
operations to include the urban poor.
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Thus by moving to an economic model based on markets principles, Mexico
carried out a major transformation in its approach to poverty alleviation. Central to
this was investing in human capital to promote participation of the poor in market
competition and constructing a safety net for those left behind by the free market
and market principles.
A second characteristic of poverty alleviation in the 1990s was the application of
a new financial discipline and the targeting of poverty programs. Unlike poverty
policy during the decades of import substituting industrialization based on fiscal
expansionism, poverty alleviation policy in the 1990s was carried out in conjunc-
tion with economic restructuring and agricultural trade liberalization that gradually
did away with agricultural protectionist policy. During this process the Salinas and
Zedillo governments both cut back greatly on state subsidies supporting the pro-
ducer and consumer prices of basic foods and turned instead to a policy of targeting
poverty alleviation which used the funds made available by the cutbacks to give
selected assistance to the poor (Consejo Consultivo del Programa Nacional de
Solidaridad 1994, pp. 15–22; Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1997, p. 54).
This targeting was made more rigorous during Zedillo’s presidency. In 1997 his
government brought out new guidelines that would exclude the moderately poor
(those not categorized as among the extremely impoverished) from eligibility in the
poverty alleviation program and regard them as part of the populace subject to
general social services, while PROGRESA would target only the extremely impov-
erished in rural areas (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1997, pp. 15–19, 57–65). The new
guidelines were the work of technocrats with neoliberal ideas about social develop-
ment that encouraged free competition based on market principles and targeted for
public support only those people who could not break free from absolute poverty
through their own efforts.13 However, as previously pointed out, extension of the
social security system, even to the urban poor, has not made progress, and imple-
menting the new guidelines could dilute the level of services provided to the huge
general population in Mexico that is not extremely impoverished.
A third characteristic was the introduction of a formula for technical resource
allocation to poverty alleviation policy which was begun during Zedillo’s term in
office. This increased the objectivity and transparency of poverty alleviation policy.
The long-ruling PRI used the poverty policy budget as a political resource for re-
covering its legitimacy, and the Salinas government’s PRONASOL became a breed-
ing ground for political clientelism linked directly to strong presidential authority
(Dresser 1994) which was criticized not only within Mexico but also by interna-
tional organizations. After infighting within the government at the start of the Zedillo
13 The technocrat who took the initiative in drawing up new guidelines for poverty alleviation policy
in the Zedillo government was Santiago Levy, Sub-Secretary to the SHCP during that period. His
basic ideas about social development and poverty alleviation policy can be found in Levy (1994).
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regime, technocrats in the SHCP, which held the real reins of power over adminis-
trating social development (Valencia Lomelí and Aguirre Riveles 1998, pp. 82–85;
Torres 1996, pp. 70–73), began the decentralization of poverty alleviation policy14
and introduced a technical formula for resource allocation to the program of tar-
geted poverty alleviation through which they likely sought to rectify the problems
that had been criticized in the previous regime. But decentralizing the allocation of
resources failed to overcome the chronic insufficiency of funding sources that plagued
poor cities, towns, and villages. Meanwhile the strict means test for categorizing
household finances, which was an important part of the government’s new
PROGRESA, divided households in poor communities into those eligible for assis-
tance and those not eligible. This created a new social gap based on public assis-
tance which in turn caused new problems.15
As PROGRESA was starting up 1997, the IMSS pension reforms were carried
out which shifted pensions from the pay-as-you-go system to the private capitaliza-
tion system and thereby individualized pension accounts. This brought an end to
social security as a system based on the principle of the economically active popu-
lation supporting those living on pensions. At the same time, by clarifying the rela-
tionship between contributions and benefits, the surplus in the pension account could
no longer be diverted for augmenting the infrastructure and services in other sec-
tors of the social insurance system. It was no coincidence that pension accounts
were put on a private, individual basis at the same time that poverty alleviation
policy came to be based on more selective and individualized principles. Underly-
ing both were ideas about the liberal welfare state that conformed to neoliberal
economic development strategy. These reforms brought basic social services to the
extremely impoverished, and there were many aspects of improvement in the sys-
tem such as increased transparency and cost-efficiency. However, even if the poten-
tial productive capabilities and employability of extremely impoverished youths
can be upgraded through this investment in human resources, with the accelerating
pace of free trade, the future remains bleak for poor peasants and their traditional
uncompetitive methods of farming. In urban areas the growing informal economy
and increasing employment instability for workers means that a majority of Mexico’s
population will continue to be left out of the social insurance system. The next
section will examine these issues more closely.
14 From 1996 through 1997 the Zedillo government carried out the decentralization of health services
and the building of basic infrastructure in impoverished areas. This was undertaken as part of
decentralizing state finances that was promoted under the name of a “new federalism.” Resources
were allocated to areas on the basis of poverty indices and social indicators.
15 Augstin Escobar, a researcher at the Research and Superior Studies Center in Social Anthropology
(CIESAS), who led a project to qualitatively evaluate PROGRESA in six communities located in
the states of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, and Michoacán, pointed out the existing social problems
caused by the disparity of social services between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the same
poor communities (In an interview with the author, May 3, 1998, at CIESAS, Guadalajara).
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IV. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM
A. Economic Conditions
The biggest economic factor for social security reform in the 1990s was the 1982
debt crisis and the ensuing rapid shift in Mexico’s economic development model.
In an effort to rejuvenate the slumping economy after the 1982 debt crisis, the
Salinas government aggressively promoted trade liberalization and the attracting of
foreign direct investment. The switch to this new economic strategy brought the
economy back to overall growth in the early 1990s, but in December 1994, soon
after the start of the Zedillo government, Mexico was hit once again by a financial
crisis. The severe recession that followed two economic crises along with the
privatization of public corporations and the accelerated promotion of economic
liberalization which wrought greater labor market flexibility brought on the bank-
ruptcy of many small and medium-sized companies and a rise in the number of
unemployed and underemployed. However, despite the difficult economic condi-
tions, the ratio of unemployment remained low during the time.16 One reason for
this was that workers who had lost jobs in the formal sector were absorbed into the
informal sector with its many tertiary industries. According to the estimates of the
ILO, the ratio of employment in Mexico’s urban informal sector increased rapidly
from 24.7 per cent in 1980 to 39.9 per cent in 1985 and 48.0 per cent in 1990
(Hernández Laos 2000, p. 865).
During the period of developmentalist state policies and import substituting in-
dustrialization, workers in the urban formal sector enjoyed the preferential benefits
of stable employment with its concomitant social security services, as well as wage
raises that compensated for inflation and the availability of daily necessities at low
subsidized prices. But with the implementation (from 1983) of policies to restrain
official minimum wage hikes with the aim of curbing inflation and large-scale re-
ductions in subsidies as part of economic restructuring, these preferential benefits
were lost.
In the agricultural sector, the economic restructuring of the 1980s reduced the
subsidies being provided to food production. As trade liberalization accelerated in
the 1990s, tariffs on imported agricultural products were reduced in stages. Kelly
16 The ratio of unemployment in Mexico during the 1990s was: 1990/2.6%, 1991/2.6%, 1993/3.4%,
1994/3.7%, 1995/6.2%, 1996/5.5%, 1997/3.7%, 1998/3.2%, 1999/2.5%, and 2000/2.2% (Labor
Ministry homepage and INEGI homepage). Reasons for this low unemployment rate were such
factors as the definition of unemployment used in Mexico’s employment statistics: if a person has
worked at least one hour during the survey month and expects to return to work within a month, the
person is regarded as employed; also because many workers are not covered by unemployment
insurance, they quickly move into the informal sector in order to find work.
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(2001) pointed out that the large-scale reductions in state subsidies to support the
producer price of agricultural products, the consequent fall in these prices and rapid
trade liberalization caused a substantial fall in the real income of farmers in the
1990s and brought further rural impoverishment.
The previous examination of the 1990s reform of social security shows that re-
form was undertaken in response to the rapid economic and social restructuring
that followed the introduction of the market economy model and was an effort by
the government to cope with rising social costs. As shown in Table I, federal expen-
ditures on the social insurance system and poverty alleviation continued to expand,
with the exception of some years which followed the financial crisis at the end of
1994. Regarding the IMSS, possible factors for the rising level of state outlays for
this social insurance system included the increases in premium rates and in the
minimum level of pension payments that took place during the first half of the
1990s,17 payments on the debt of the pay-as-you-go pension system which the gov-
17 In cases where the accumulated pension savings of insured workers who had made premium pay-
ments for 1,250 weeks or longer did not reach the level for the minimum pension, the federal
TABLE  I
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC SOCIAL INSURANCE AND
POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS, 1990–2000
(At 1995 costs / in million pesos)
Whole Social Insurance IMSS ISSSTE Poverty Alleviation
Year System Programs
Cost % of GDP Cost % of GDP Cost % of GDP Cost % of GDP
1990 12,862.2 0.85 8,205.8 0.54 2,079.8 0.14 12,000.2 0.79
1991 15,889.6 1.00 9,998.7 0.63 3,285.9 0.21 14,862.6 0.93
1992 18,403.5 1.13 11,234.5 0.69 4,186.8 0.26 17,948.0 1.10
1993 21,202.5 1.27 12,935.6 0.78 4,458.2 0.27 18,409.4 1.10
1994 24,053.7 1.36 14,577.9 0.83 5,174.0 0.29 19,329.6 1.10
1995 23,595.9 1.41 13,959.2 0.83 5,065.5 0.30 17,933.0 1.07
1996 23,382.0 1.37 13,572.5 0.79 4,849.6 0.28 17,848.7 1.04
1997 26,355.0 1.49 14,502.6 0.82 5,374.2 0.30 17,190.8 0.97
1998 34,183.2 1.83 19,095.6 1.02 5,945.3 0.32 18,457.6 0.99
1999 37,006.9 1.80 20,016.3 0.97 6,516.6 0.32 19,706.1 0.96
2000 40,143.8 1.94 21,624.1 1.04 7,199.7 0.35 21,479.3 1.04
Sources: Presidencia de la República (2001, 2002). Calculation of the 1995 cost was by the
author. The 1995 cost was deflated by the IMF (2002, p. 728) consumer price index.
Notes: 1. Whole social insurance system includes federal expenditures on the social insur-
ance system in addition to those on the IMSS and ISSSTE.
2. Federal expenditures on the IMSS are only those covering the state’s contributions
as stipulated by the Social Insurance Law.
3. Poverty alleviation programs include federal expenditures on PRONASOL,
PROGRESA, IMSS-SOLIDARIDAD, the food assistance program, infrastructure
building in impoverished areas, and employment/income support programs for the
poor.
279MEXICO
ernment incurred as transition costs in the shift to the private capitalization pension
system, and the costs of setting up the new voluntary participation health program.
The increase in the minimum pension payment and the establishment of voluntary
participation health services can be regarded as measures to cope with the destabi-
lization of employment, the fall in real worker wages, the growth of the informal
sector, and other rising social costs brought on by economic liberalization. For the
same reason expenditures rose during the 1990s on targeted programs aimed at
alleviating poverty, but as can be seen from Table I, the rate of increase stayed
below that of expenditures on the social insurance system, indicating that even with
the reform of social security in the 1990s, the Mexican government continued to
give priority to maintaining the social insurance system. Moreover, although IMSS
pension reform was carried out as part of restructuring the social security system in
order to rebuild state finances, even after the reforms, state expenditures on social
security services continued to expand, indicating that these reforms were not a short-
to midterm financial retrenchment, rather they were aimed at the long-term
sustainability of financing the social insurance system.
Looking at these reforms within the context of the rapid restructuring of federal
expenditures after the 1982 debt crisis, during the 1980s federal government finances
remained in the red due to Mexico’s debt excess and to economic stagnation; but
during the 1990s both situations improved, and as the state’s finances grew sounder,
expenditures on social services began to expand again (see Figure 1). Expenditures
on these services as a ratio of total federal expenditures were: 1975/27.8%, 1980/
31.0%, 1985/31.1%, 1990/38.2%, 1995/53.5%, and 2000/60.7%, showing that they
expanded rapidly in the 1990s.18 This growth indicates that the process of restruc-
turing greatly reduced economic intervention by the state, scaled down state expen-
ditures, and part of the funds made available by this downsizing of the state’s role
were used to increase expenditures on social services. With the social security re-
forms of the 1990s and the rapid restructuring of federal expenditures, the propor-
tion of resources allocated to social expenditures rose, making it possible to gradu-
ally expand these expenditures. However, in spite of this recent trend, Mexico’s
social expenditures still remain low in comparison with other Latin American coun-
tries which have achieved a similar level of economic development.19 The main
factors for this are the dual structure of Mexico’s social security system and the
limited amount of social services provided to the poor.
government made up the shortfall. During the Salinas government, the level of the minimum pen-
sion was raised in stages from 40 per cent up to 100 per cent of the official minimum wage.
18 Calculated by the author based on Instituto Nacional de Solidaridad (1996, p. 44) and Presidencia
de la República (2002).
19 As a ratio of GDP, public expenditures on social services during the 1998–99 period were 9.1% for
Mexico compared with 22.0% for Venezuela, 21.0% for Brazil, 20.5% for Argentina, 16.8% for
Costa Rica, and 16.0% for Chile (ECLAC 2001, p. 24).
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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B. Political Conditions
The 1988 presidential election was a cliffhanger with the PRI candidate, Carlos
Salinas, winning by the unprecedentedly narrow vote margin of 50.35 per cent, as
suspicions of improprieties raised questions about his victory over the opposition
candidate, Cuautémoc Cárdenas, who had broken away from the PRI and was sup-
ported by the small opposition parties. The narrowness of Salinas’ victory was clear
evidence that the vote-gathering ability of the PRI had dropped substantially. Eco-
nomic restructuring was eroding the PRI’s vote-gathering base founded on state
corporatism; at the same time, Mexico’s growing democratization had enabled the
opposition parties to increase their influence. The Salinas government made strenu-
ous efforts to regain its legitimacy and to broaden its popular support base. This
was one of the reasons why a modernist Salinas resorted to the PRI’s traditional
populist method of carrying out an aggressive advertising campaign that impressed
upon the people the idea of realizing a new social justice through PRONASOL and
making politicized allocations of resources through this program. As many research-
ers have pointed out, this effort to mobilize the masses was clearly the Salinas
government’s attempt to reverse the PRI’s slipping political legitimacy (Dresser
1994; Pardo López 1996; and others).
Aside from PRONASOL and seeking to make Mexico’s lower classes a new
base of support for the PRI, the Salinas government also intended to undertake a
partial reexamination of the long-standing corporatist relations with the officialist
labor unions. Part of this was the government’s support for the formation (in 1990)
of the Federation of Goods and Services Unions (FESEBES), a national organiza-
tion of four unions that staunchly supported the government’s modernization policy,
two of which were the Telephone Workers’ Union of Mexico (STRM) and the Elec-
tricity Workers’ Union of Mexico (SME). Behind this government support was the
clear intention of creating a new counterweight to the CTM inside the National
Labor Congress (CT), the largest federation of officialist labor unions (Samstad
2002, p. 11).20 The Salinas government suppressed unions, even those affiliated
with the CTM, that opposed its modernization policy; but for unions like the STRM
that supported the government’s privatization plans, the government worked out a
policy of preferential treatment that included generous compensation to workers
after privatization had been implemented. This intermediation of interests built be-
tween FESEBES’s unions and the Salinas government was different from that based
on the corporatist relationship built between traditional officialist labor and the state,
in that the former was based on informal, personalistic ties between the leaders of
the unions and the officeholders of the Salinas government (Samstad 2002, p. 5).
Bowing to government pressure, the CTM accepted the new policy including the
20 The FESEBES retained their own membership in the CT.
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decisions to liberalize trade and privatize public enterprises. It was also compelled
to make big compromises on the reform of social security. For example, in 1992
when the government’s bill creating SAR was passed by the federal congress, the
union-controlled management of the individual accounts in INFONAVIT was re-
placed, and the management and administration of these funds was transferred to
SAR. This also ended INFONAVIT’s direct involvement in housing construction.
The CTM had strongly opposed this plan because it would lose the vested interests
it had acquired in using INFONAVIT to mediate in housing and financing for union
members. However some member unions of the CT, including those of FESEBES,
supported the government’s plan and opposed the CTM, and the Salinas govern-
ment turned a deaf ear to the CTM’s protests. Ultimately the latter was compelled
to accept the government’s draft (Murillo 2001, pp. 95–106).
With the coming of the Zedillo presidency the breakup of the CT grew all the
more imminent. Under the slogan of “Democratize the CT and down with
corporatism,” FESEBES together with the National Union of Education Workers
(SNTE), the National Union of Social Security Workers (SNTSS) and other unions
formed the Forum on Unionism Facing the Nation (FORO) in February 1995
(Samstad 2002, p. 12). When the bill revising the IMSS Social Insurance Law was
announced, only one-month prior to the national assembly’s deliberation on the
revisions, the newly organized FORO came out strongly against the Zedillo
government’s drafted revisions of the law, and it called for a united movement of
pensions in a strike to protest the government’s reforms and its economic policy
(Correa 1995b, p. 30). Although the FESEBES affiliated unions had supported the
modernization policy of the previous Salinas regime, they now had made a com-
plete about-face and stood in opposition to the policy drafted by the Zedillo govern-
ment. This caused a split within the CT between the unions centered on the CTM
that supported the government’s reforms and those centering on the unions that
belonged to FORO which opposed the reforms. Leading the opposition side was
the chairman of the STRM, Hernández Juarez. In an interview with the weekly
magazine, Proceso, he strongly denounced the chairman of the CT, Rafael
Rivapalacio, who as representative of labor had, along with the representative of
the employers’ association (USEM), supported the government’s policy while ig-
noring the views of the unions in the CT that opposed the reforms. Juarez called for
the removal of the CTM leadership who he said had become the undemocratic
ringleaders of the CT (Correa 1995a, pp. 20–24).
In the end, FORO, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) which strongly
opposed the PRI’s reform plan, and other opposing social groups could not unite in
a strong force to stop the government’s decision, and in December 1995 the bill
revising the IMSS law was passed. The Zedillo government had skillfully employed
the still existing corporatist relationships of the PRI. By negotiating with the CT
and CTM which supported the IMSS pension reform bill, the government success-
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fully outmaneuvered the forces of the opposition labor unions. This was possible
because at that time, 1995, the CT had not yet completely split and was still func-
tioning as the representative organization of the officialist unions.21
Another factor accounting for the speedy passage of IMSS reform was that in
1995 when the government presented its reform bill, the legislature was still con-
trolled by the PRI. In the 1997 midterm elections the party lost its majority in the
lower house, and in the 2000 presidential election the National Action Party (PAN)
took over control of the government. But in 1995 the PRI still held a one-party
majority in the lower and upper houses, and the passage of the social security law
was literally a matter of the PRI members bulldozing the bill through the federal
congress (El Financiero, December 13, 1995).
V. FINAL REMARKS
IMSS pension reform in the 1990s shifted Mexico’s pension system from a pay-as-
you-go to a private capitalization system. At the same time, neoliberal reform of the
social security system was carried out with greater rigor on the targeting of poverty
alleviation policy which was linked to the step-by-step reduction of subsidies and
other forms of direct state intervention in the economy. The reforms were imple-
mented through the initiative of technocrats in the SHCP and the Bank of Mexico
with the primary aim of increasing the conformity and the supplementary character
of the social security system to an economic model based on market principles. The
reform of the IMSS pension system carried out in 1997 was a drastic one that reor-
ganized the pension accounts of 80 per cent of all Mexican workers participating in
pension programs into individual investment-type pension accounts.
The political development behind these market-friendly reforms of social secu-
rity was the greater political monopoly on policy making that the state came to have
during the period of the reforms. One of the main factors which made possible the
state’s rapid and unilateral policy making was that the framework of the state
corporatism built up during the long period of PRI one-party rule remained essen-
tially intact and the CT’s authority to represent labor in negotiations with the state
continued to function until the mid-1990s. However, a steady breakdown of the CT
during the 1990s weakened the political clout of the officialist labor unions. By
taking advantage of these political circumstances, the state was able to increase its
monopolistic power vis-à-vis the position of labor in the negotiations on social
security reforms, and it was able to outmaneuver the veto power of the dissident
unions among the officialist labor unions.
21 Thereafter it proved impossible to heal the split within the CT over IMSS pension reform, and in
November 1997 the STRM, SNTSS, and other unions withdrew from the CT to set up the National
Union of Workers (UNT).
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Using Esping-Andersen’s definition of a welfare state regime to define Mexico
during the formation of its social security system, it was a limited conservative
regime that linked social security with employment in the formal sector while so-
cial assistance to the poor followed as a residual component. Mexico’s social secu-
rity system gradually developed from the 1950s through the 1970s, but the peas-
antry and the urban poor were excluded from this development, and the social
assistance that these groups received was strongly residual in character. One reason
for the exclusiveness and dual structure of the country’s social security system was
economic: to keep a stable, secure labor force that was needed to maintain eco-
nomic development. Another reason was the high priority that the developmentalist
state put on expanding social security to workers in the urban formal sector as a
result of the political strategy employed by the Cárdenas government which sought
to co-opt and gain the support of organized labor by drawing it into the state corpo-
ratist framework. Although encumbered by numerous problems, the welfare state
in Mexico continued to expand until the debt crisis in 1982. This expansion, how-
ever, particularly during the 1970s, was interlinked with developmentalist state in-
tervention that was carried out by the populist regimes of the time. But the steadily
worsening deficit in state finances meant that the expansion could not be sustained
financially.
Social security reform during the 1990s along with economic restructuring brought
a soundness back to state finances, but the reverse side of this was the retrogression
of Mexico’s welfare state which led to a deterioration in urban employment condi-
tions and an increase in rural poverty. The reforms provided the extremely impov-
erished in rural areas with access to basic social services; they also increased the
transparency and cost-efficiency of the social security system. However, the re-
forms were based on the concept of a liberal welfare state, and from the reform-
planning stage an economic and social disparity in social services was taken as a
premise along with the individualization and rigorous categorization of the social
security system. As a result, Mexico’s welfare state regime shifted from being a
limited conservative one to a hybrid-type liberal welfare regime.
As the reforms were implemented, the state’s expenditures on the social security
system gradually rose, but these remained low when compares with other Latin
American countries. One of the main factors of this problem was the social security
system’s dual structure and social stratification, which continues to be an unre-
solved problem plaguing the system. With the market playing an ever greater role
in the economy, but the country still retaining its fragmented, stratified social secu-
rity system, Mexico will have to undertake more fundamental social security re-
forms; otherwise it will continue to face difficulties in achieving an expanded wel-
fare state in the true sense of that term.
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APPENDIX TABLE
CHRONOLOGY OF MEXICO’S SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Years Major Events
1917 Constitution of 1917 enacted; Article 123 makes reference to the rights of workers
1925 Establishment of a limited social insurance system for federal government employ-
ees
1926 Establishment of a limited social insurance system for armed forces personnel
1928 Establishment of a limited social insurance system for teachers
1935 Establishment of a social insurance system for oil workers
1936–38 Establishment of a social insurance system for railroad workers
1941 Establishment of a social insurance system for electric power workers
1943 Enactment of the Social Insurance Law
1944 Creation of the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS)
1959 Creation of the Institute of Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE)
1972 Establishment of the Institute of the National Housing Fund for Workers
(INFONAVIT) and the Housing Fund of the Institute of Social Security and Ser-
vice for State Workers (FOVISSSTE)
1973 Revision of the Social Insurance Law; The revised law mandated the provision of
social security services to urban the self-employed and to residents in rural areas
1973–83 Implementation of the Program of Public Investment for Rural Development (PIDER)
for the purpose of alleviating rural poverty
1974 Start of the National Program for Social Solidarity aimed at expanding health ser-
vices into rural areas
1977–82 Implementation of the General Coordinator of the National Plan for Depressed Zones
and Marginalized Groups (COPLAMAR)
1980–82 Implementation of the Mexican Food System (SAM) for the purpose of increasing
the production of basic foods
1989–94 Implementation of the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL)
1992 Revision of the Social Insurance Law; Establishment of the Saving for Retirement
System (SAR)
1995 Revision of the Social Insurance Law; The decision to reform the IMSS pension
system
1995 Revision of the General Health Law; The decentralization of health services
1997 Implementation of IMSS pension system reforms
1997–2001 Implementation of the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA)
2002– PROGRESA renamed the Program of Human Development (OPORTUNIDADES)
Source: By the author based on Brachet-Márquez (1994).
